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ARGUMENT
I:

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE
EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE INFERENCES ABOUT HOW
LONG THE DANGEROUS CONDITION EXISTED

This case is about whether a bar that protruded above the grass after it was installed
in 2006 as part of Herriman 's pennanent lighting infrastructure is a dangerous condition.
Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest argue that the bar was safe when it was installed in 2006, but
that it inexplicably morphed into a hazard shortly before Ms. Cochegms' injury in 2012.
Moreover, they argue that it was not dangerous for a long enough period of time for
~

Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest to have constmctive knowledge ofits existence. The evidence
proves that the bar existed long enough for Rosecrest, FCS and Herriman to have
constructive notice of the dangerous condition:
A.

The trial court found that the bar "may have existed yesterday, it may have
existed for years." 1 This fact alone requires the Court to make two reasonable
inferences: first, copper grounding rods do not suddenly appear out of
nowhere; second, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Cochegms,
the bar likely existed as a dangerous condition for years.

1

R. 730
4
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B.

The bar had been impacted by a lawnmower. Adam Jones and Monte Johnson
both testified that the cuts were likely caused by a lawnmower. 2 The rod was
also oxidized. 3

C.

Specifically, Mr. Cochegrus testified that he examined the bar in the "near
future" 4 after Ms. Cochegrus was injured. 5 He stated that it appeared rusted
and that it had been hit by a blade or "something."6

D.

Ms. Cochegrus7, Adam Jones8, Monte Johnson, 9 Marcel Cochegrus' 0 , and
Maria del Carmen Tirado Sanchez' 1 all provided testimony that the rebar was
visible, easy to identify, and should have been remedied.

2

R. 580, 12:2-15. R. 588, 22:14-24:17.

3

R. 588, 23 :7- I 2.

4

Mr. Cochegrus's first language is Spanish. He is a native of Queretaro Mexico. See

R. 324.
5

R. 56 l, 28:7-12.

6

R. 561, 29:21-23.

7

R. 569

8

R. 580, 581 and 583

9

'

R. 587

0

11

R. 348
R. 547, 624

5
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E.

Ms. Cochegrus testified landscaping personnel ran over the bar with their
lawnmowers, and that the lawnmower blades cut the bar. 12

F.

Adam Jones also testified that the lawnmower blades damaged the bar. Some
of the damage appeared oxidized. Some of the damage appeared "fresh". 13

G.

Herriman City provided evidence that "Roescrest HOA and ... FCS ... knew
about the grounding rod ... " 14

H.

Ms. Cochegrus referenced pictures of the grounding rod which demonstrate
that it was visible. 15

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to consider all evidence and
make reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Ms. Cochegrus. 16 The facts, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Cochegrus, justify the reasonable inference that
Herriman, FCS and Rosecrest had constructive notice of the re bar. In making inferences, the
Court need not speculate: an "inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact which
human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other
facts." I7 Appellee Herriman City references the following useful language: "A reasonable

12

R. 569.

13

R. 580.

I4

R. 593

15

R. 572-575

16

English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

17

Heslop v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5, ,I 22, 390 P.3d 314, 321 (quoting
Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1968)); See also USA Power, LLC v.
6
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inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducting a logical
consequence from them, while speculation is the act or practice of theorizing about matters
over which there is no certain knowledge." 18
If the Court would have considered the "logical consequences" arising from the
undisputed facts, it would have concluded that the bar existed in a dangerous state for a long
time. The trial court found that Ms. Cochegrus failed to show "when the city should have had
constructive notice" of the copper bar and six-inch hole that injured Ms. Cochegrus. 19 This
was error.
Proving constructive notice in a premises liability case requires the following:
(A) that [Defendants] had knowledge of the condition, that is,
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the
condition had existed long enough that he should have
discovered it; and (8) that after such knowledge, sufficient time
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care [they] should
have remedied it. 20

Rose v. Provo City emphasized that time is not the only factor in finding constructive
knowledge. 21 The obvious nature of the unsafe condition also plays a role. Referencing a
litany of older cases, Rose noted that other factors are relevant:

PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20,

~

128-129, 3 72 P .3d 629, 64 7 ( discussing inferences).

Ul,Winegar v. Springville Ci(v, 2014 UT App 9,
quotation marks omitted).
19

20

ii

20,319 P.3d l (citations and

R. 719.

Al!en v. Federated Dai,:F Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975) (emphasis

added).
21

Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ii 23, 67 P.3d l O17, l 020
7
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the nature and extent of the defect, its prominence in location
and otherfactors bearing on what could reasonably be expected
of a [defendant]. 22
Citing Pollari v. Salt Lake City, Rose emphasized that it is not just the amount of time
that has elapsed but the "nature," "extent," and "prominence" of the defect that is relevant. 23
A party will have constructive knowledge of large, obvious dangers in a shorter period of
time. Small, hidden dangers require longer. This principle is demonstrated in Kreyling v. St.

George City, where a hole "camouflaged by debris, leaves, and cobwebs" injured a person. 24
The court declined to impute constructive knowledge to the defendant.
The burden that the plaintiff must meet for constructive notice is not a high one.

Mingolello v. Megaplex Theaters states that"[ a] court may impute constructive notice only
when there is some evidence of the length of time the debris has been on the floor. " 25 Some
evidence is all that is necessary-and the evidence must be construed in Ms. Cochegrus'
favor. Ms. Cochegrus provided "some" evidence of the length of time that the re bar existed
in an unsafe condition.
As emphasized by the rule in Rose and Mingolello, the facts show that FCS, Rosecrest
and Herriman had constructive notice of the bar. The facts show that Ms. Cochegrus was

22

1d. (emphasis added).

23

Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 36, 17 6 P .2d 111, 117 ( 1947).

24

Kreyling v. St. George City, 2008 UT App 363, * I (memorandum decision).

2017 UT App 4, iJ 7 (quoting Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67,
(quotations omitted and emphasis added).
25

iJ

19, 196 P.3d 576)
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injured on April 29, 2012-prior to the summer lawn-mowing season. 26 Adam Jones and
Monte Johnson testified that the cuts in the bar were likely caused by a lawnmower and that
the bar was oxidized. 27 Mr. Cochegrus saw the bar shortly after the accident. He testified that
the bar appeared rusted and that it had been hit by a blade or "something." 28 Ms. Cochegrus
also testified that it had been impacted by a lawnmower. 29
The only reasonable inference from the evidence is that lawn mowing personnel drove
directly over the rebar, impacted it with their lawn-mowing blades, and left visible dents on
the rebar prior to the spring of 2012. This likely happened as early as 2006. There is no
dispute that it had been exposed to the open air for sufficient time to oxidize. The "nature
and extent" of the hazardous rebar, the fact that it was originally part of the city's lighting
infrastructure, and its "prominence in location" are all proven in the record. 30 No less than
five witnesses provided testimony that the rebarwas visible, easy to identify, and should have
been remedied.
The Defendants rely heavily on the case of Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co. 31

Goebel is distinguishable for one important reason - the Court determined that the plaintiffs

,r~ 15-16.

26

R. 65,

27

R. 580, 12:2-15; R. 588, 22:14-24:17. 588, 23:7-121

28

R. 561, 29:21-23.

29

R. 569.

30

R. 542-544, 587, 589; R. 572-575.

31

2004 UT 80, I 04 P.3d 1185.

9
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Hha[ d] offered absolutely no evidence from which a jury could infer the length of time that
[the railroad] had" notice of a dangerous gap in a railroad track. 32 This case is different
because a lawnmower ran over the copper bar and damaged it.

Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & light is distinguishable for the same reason - no
admissible evidence was provided as to the length of time that the unsafe condition existed,
and no evidence was provided as to how long the utility company had to remedy an unsafe
condition. 33 Ms. Cochegrus has provided evidence that was lacking in Goebel and

Fishbaugh. An overwhelming amount of evidence is unnecessary, only Hsome" is required. 34
FCS, Rosecrest and Herriman argue that the bar was not examined by the city until
months after Ms. Cochegrus' injury. This ignores the evidence because Mr. Cochegrus, Ms.
Cochegrus and several other witnesses observed oxidation, and lawn-mowing nicks and
dings shortly after Ms. Cochegrus' injury. Mr. Johnson noted that the bar was oxidized. 35 Ms.
Cochegrus testified that lawn-mowing personnel ran over it shortly after the injury. 36
FCS, Rosecrest and Herriman also argue that the rebar was not rusted, but that it was
oxidized, or otherwise rust-colored. Mr. Johnson did not state that the rebar was naturally
rust-colored, the exchange actually went as follows:

32

/d. at ii 25.

33

969 P.2d 403, 408 (Utah 1998).

3

-'+Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, ,, 19, 196 P.3d 576.

35

R. 455, 23:7-12.

36

R. 569.

)0
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Q. (Mr. Parkinson): Okay. The metal up at the top is kind of
oxidized looking, or rusted looking to some extent or another.
At least I would describe it that way. Is that a fair way to
describe it?
A. (Mr. Johnson): I would say oxidized. I would not say rust.
It's copper. Copper doesn't rust. 37
Mr. Johnson correctly stated what copper does when exposed to air- it oxidizes rather
than rusts. ''Oxidize" is defined as follows: "to combine with oxygen or with more oxygen." 38
Oxidation does not happen overnight. This is a fact understood by common experience. For
oxidation to appear, the rebar would have needed to be exposed to air for a significant
amount of time, i.e., the rebar existed in a dangerous condition for a significant amount of
time.

It is not speculation to infer the facts in favor of Ms. Cochegrus. In fact the opposite
is true. FCS, Rosecrest and Herriman 's version of events require some fairly impressive
mental gymnastics: the re bar suddenly materialized out of the ground after having been safely
installed in 2006, lawn mowing personnel only started running over it after the accident
occurred, and despite being plainly visible, no one could see it while mowing the lawn, dayin-and-day-out, for years and years. These "inferences" are illogical and strain credulity.
Ms. Cochegrus' conclusions are logical from the facts at hand. The trial court failed
to make these reasonable and logical inferences as required by Rule 56 and the attendant case
law. Therefore, this Court should overturn the trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment.
37

R. 455, 23:7-12.

38

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, "oxidize," page 1613.
II
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II.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A TEMPORARY CONDITION VS.
A PERMANENT CONDITION IS CONFUSING AND SHOULD BE
REVISED

Counsel for Ms. Cochegrus conceded that ''[t]hc hazard in this case was, admittedly,
a temporary condition" during oral argument. 39 This concession was not based on the
pennanent nature of the copper bar originally installed as part of Herriman City's permanent
infrastructure. Instead, counsel for Ms. Cochegrus was pigeon-holed into a difficult position
by existing case law. Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., and its progeny, hold that
pennanent installations-like railroad tracks 40 and street lights41 -are actually temporary unsafe
~

conditions when they do not continue to work as originally intended. In other cases, lettuce
leaves which fall on a supermarket floor, and self starting shopping carte are permanent,
unsafe conditions. 42
The temporary/permanent distinction is confusing. It makes it difficult for lawyers to
properly advise their clients, and provides uncertain guidance for Judges deciding premises
liability cases. The Utah Supreme Court should take this opportunity to clarify the law and
eliminate this confusion.
In 1996, Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets defined permanent unsafe conditions:

39

40

41

R. 555.

Goehel, 2004 UT 80, 104 P .3d 1185
Fishhaugh, 969 P.2d at 405.

42

Cw?field v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (UT Ct. App. I 992);
Wal-Mart, 2002 UT App 412, 61 P.3d 287
12
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Carlile v.

The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, or of
a stai1way, etc. or in equipment or machi11e1J1, or in the manner
<~l use, which was created or chosen by the defendant (or his
agents), orfor which he is responsible. In such circumstances,
where the defendant either created the condition, or is
responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and no
further proof of notice is necessary. 43
Under the rule in Schnuphase, a permanent condition is a structure, equipment or a building.
It may also be the condition of a structure that a property owner creates, chooses, or for

which he is responsible. 44 In theory, this rule seems straightforward. In practice, hardly any
condition is labeled as"pennanent," even when it fits the above description.
There are numerous cases that, at first glance, fit the description of a permanent
condition. For example, cases that involve sidewalks,45 asphalted planter strips, 46 street
lighting, 47 sprinkler systems,48 pot holes in parking lots, 49 holes in parking strips, 50 or railroad

43

Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (emphasis

added).

44/d.
45

Kerr v. City of Salt lake, 2013 UT 75, il 2, 322 P.3d 669, 672.

46

Rose, 2003 UT App at ii 15, 67 P.3d at I 022.

47

Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & light, a div. <~/Pac{/icorp, 969 P.2d 403, 403-04 (Utah

48

Porter v. Farmington City Corp., 2014 UT App 12, ~ 6, 318 P.3d 1198, 1200.

1998).

49

Johnson v. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, ,1,13, 18, 206 P.3d 302, 304, 307.

5

°Kreyling v. St. George City, 2008 UT App 363, * I (memorandum decision).
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crossings 51 are "structure[s], equipment, or machinery." However, in each case, these are
labeled temporary conditions. If the above-listed conditions are not pennanent stmctures,
what is? Even more telling is Matheson v. lvlarbec Investments, LLC, which dealt with a
defective stair in an apartment complex. 52 The facts of Matheson fall squarely within the
language from Schnuphase. The Schnuphase court stated that when a person is "responsible"
for a "stairway," a defect in the stairway is a permanent, unsafe condition. Then, in 2007, the

Matheson court decided that a stairway is a temporary unsafe condition following the rule
in Goebel. The Matheson court did not apply the permanent condition rule from Schnuphase.
The court stated that defendant was only responsible for "maintenance" of a defective
stairway. 53
This highlights an additional problem with the temporary/permanent distinction. The
"for which he is responsible" language from Schnuphase has been rendered useless. Goebel

v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co. limited the Hfor which he is responsible" language in
Schnuphase by stating that a party is not responsible for a condition if the party's
responsibility is "only in the context of maintenance, and not for its existence in the first
~

place."54 In Goebel, the plaintiff argued that he was injured because of a gap in the field

51

Goebel, 2004 UT at ilil 4-6, I 04 P .3d at 1189.

52

2007 UT App 363, il 3, I 73 P.3d 199,201.

:,·3 Id. aqj 6, 20 I.
54

2004 UT at il 20, I 04 P.3d at 1193.
14
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panels of a railroad crossing. 55 The court found no notice of the gap because Salt Lake City
Southern Railroad Company did not create the condition, and therefore was only responsible
for maintenance. 56

Goebel and Matheson have eroded the "permanent condition" rule in Schnuphase.
They have eliminated a property owners duty to maintain property for which he or she takes
responsibility. To be blunt, Ms. Cochegrus conceded that the bar was a temporary condition
only because there is no clear understanding of what constitutes a pennanent unsafe
condition under current Utah law. The Schnuphase rule acknowledged that if a party takes
responsibility for a condition, notice was not required. 57 In the post Goebel, Fishbaugh and

Matheson landscape, this is no longer the case. This Court should do away with the
temporary/permanent distinction and clarify the conflict between Schnuphase and Goebel.
This recommendation is not without support. Section 343 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts states the following:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees [. ]58

55

ld.at,I6, 1189.

56

/d. at iJ 20, 1193.

57

Canjield, 841 P.2d at 1226.

58

Restatement (Second) of Torts, §343, Dangerous Condition Known to or
Discoverable by Possessor ( 1965).
15
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A possessor of land is liable if he knows - either through creation, actual knowledge, or
constructive knowledge-about a dangerous condition.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the same rule. Kyte v. Mid Hudson Wendico, Inc.,
a New York case, states, "[i]n a premises liability case, a defendant property owner, or a
party in possession or control of real property, who moves for summary judgment has the
initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the alleged defective

condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence." 59
It makes good sense to adopt a standard that requires actual or constructive notice,
save in the instance when a party created the condition. When a party creates the unsafe
condition, or sets in motion a method of operation that creates the unsafe conditions, such
as in Canfield, 60 then no notice would be required.
Adopting this model would eliminate the confusion surrounding the temporary/
pennanent distinction and allow for the analysis to concentrate on creation or notice. While
the temporary/permanent distinction may have had some validity historically, it now does
nothing but muddy the water in premises liability cases. It makes more sense to first
detennine if a defendant created or had notice of the unsafe condition. If a party creates the
condition, then no notice would be required. If a party did not create the condition, then
actual or constructive notice would be necessary, and those detenninations would depend on

59

131 A.D. 3d 452,453 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (emphasis added).

60

Id. at 227-228.

16
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the facts of the case - whether the condition is water on the floor of a grocery store or re bar
sticking out of the ground.
In this case, there is ample evidence that Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest had actual
notice of the copper bar that caused Ms. Cochegrus's injuries. Assuming arguendo that they
did not have actual notice, knowledge should be imputed to them. As detailed in point I, the
bar existed long enough and was conspicuous enough for Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest to
have constructive notice.

III.

ROSECREST ANDFCSHADADUTYTOMAINTAINTHEPARKING
STRIP.

Rosecrest and FCS argue that they had no duty to maintain the parking strip. They are
wrong. 61 Herriman Code 7-6-1 places a duty on Rosecrest and FCS. The code states, "[i]t
shall be the duty of each owner of real property abutting or fronting upon any street, highway
or alley within the city, to repair and maintain in good condition all public curbs, curb ramps,
gutters, park strips and sidewalks across or immediately abutting their property."62 There is
no question that Rosecrest and FCS had a duty "to repair and maintain in good condition"
the parking strip and to remedy the unsafe condition that injured Ms. Cochegrus.

61

Herriman City did not argue that it had no duty to maintain the parking strip in its
appellate brief.
62

Herriman Code 7-6-1.
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Rosecrest and FCS dispute whether they maintained the parking strip in question.
There is evidence to the contrary. Adam Jones, who lives in Rosecrest Village, 63 stated the
following in his deposition:
Q. (Mr Parkinson): Okay. So tell me what you know about who
mows.
A. (Mr. Jones): I don't know the company who does our snow
or our mowing. But from - since I've lived there - which is five
years - they've mowed the park strip and the lower section,
which is on the west side of the sidewalk. There's a grassy
section, then a rock wall, then another grassy section. And
they've mowed and maintained that whole section.
Q. Are they the same company that does the interior?
A. Yes 64
Ms. Cochegrus is entitled to the inference, through the testimony of Adam Jones, that the
same company that mows the interior of Rosecrest Village maintained the parking strip in
question. Rosecrest and FCS maintained the grounds of Rosecrest Village and thereby they
also maintained the parking strip.
Rosecrest and FCS may not have had the right to cut the rebar or maintain He1Timan
City's lighting infrastructure, but that hardly is the limit of their options in maintaining the
parking strip. They could have placed a flag in the ground to warn pedestrians of the location
of the re bar. They could have called Herriman City and infonned them of the condition, and
then made sure that Herriman City resolved it. They could have asked Herriman City for
permission to cut the rebar themselves. They could have spray-painted the rebar a bright
color so it was more visible. The rebar and the hole were an unsafe condition on the parking
63
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strip that Rosecrest and FCS had a statutory duty to maintain. Removal of the re bar was not
the only option in regards to maintenance. Rosecrest and FCS could have undertaken any
number of remedies to prevent Ms. Cochegms's injuries.
Rosecrest and FCS cite Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. for the proposition
that they have no duty to maintain the parking strip. 65 Hill is distinguishable from Ms.
Cochegms's case. In Hill, the defendants had no statutory duty to maintain the land at issue.
In this instance, Herriman City imposes an affirmative duty on abutting landowners to
maintain the parking strips. Rosecrest owned the abutting land and they hired FCS to
maintain it. Both had the duty to maintain the parking strip by statute and by contract. In Hill,
the homeowner' s association ended up settling with the plaintiff since they were not granted
summary judgment on the issue of whether they owed a duty to the plaintiff. 66 The duties of
the maintenance company, Superior Property Management Services, Inc., did not extend to
the tree roots that injured the plaintiff in that case and they did not violate its obligations
under their maintenance contract. 67 In this instance, FCS was hired to maintain Rosecrest
Village's grounds. 68 They mowed the parking strip. They had the duty to maintain and
remove unsafe conditions from the grounds they were maintaining. A person who undertakes

65

2013 UT 60, 321 P.3d 1054.
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/d. at il 7, I 056.
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Id. at ilil 2, 6-7, 1055-56.
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R. 616-617
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the task of maintaining another person's property is liable for negligence despite the fact that
he or she does not own it. 69
Herriman City imposed an affirmative duty on Rosecrest and FCS to maintain the
parking strip. The deposition of Adam Jones supports the inference that they did maintain
that area. Accordingly, Rosecrest and FCS had a duty to maintain the parking strip and
protect against unsafe conditions.

CONCLUSION
The Third District Court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. Ms.
Cochegrus is entitled to reasonable inferences in her favor from the evidence provided. The
distinction of permanent and temporary conditions should be overturned and replaced with
a creation and notice standard. Additionally, the evidence supports an inference that the
Defendants had notice of the rusty rebar and six-inch hole. All the Defendants had a duty to
remedy the unsafe condition and are liable for the injuries it caused. Summary judgment
should be reversed and this case remanded to the District Court.

69

See e.g. Salt lake City v. Schubach, United Pac. Ins. Co., Intervener, 108 Utah 266,
274, 159 P.2d 149, 152 ( 1945)
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